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1. Introduction 
The landslide election of a new British government on 1st May 1997 
ended five years in office for John Major's Conservative administration, 
and eighteen years of uninterrupted Conservative rule. Humiliated after 
the ERM debacle in 1992, with its credibility in tatters, the Major 
government never really recovered. Despite reasonably good economic 
performance (by Britain's standards) since then, the Major government 
was plagued by division over Europe, and weakened by a precarious 
parliamentary position. The Labour government, in contrast, now 
enjoys a huge parliamentary majority and is in a position to deliver on 
its election promises. The economy is also in reasonably good shape, 
superficially at least. The prospects look good - but do the policies? 
This paper will ask: what is the current British government offering in 
terms of economic policy? In doing so, it will focus on industrial policy, 
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given the weakness of Britain's industrial base. 
The paper will begin by setting the scene by outlining the broad 
characteristics of industrial policy in Britain over the past few decades, 
before moving on to outline what may be considered as the key eco-
nomic problems faced by the government in promoting industrial 
development, and finishing with an evaluation of both what it is doing 
now and what it is offering for the future. 
2. British Industrial Policy: a brief historical sketch 
There is much disagreement on how best to characterise British 
industrial policy since the Second World War (Reynolds and Coates, 
1996). Cutting through that debate, some of the key words which can 
arguably be used to outline policy would be: discontinuity; inconsistency; 
reactive; and liberal. Discontinuity has come with sharp reversals of 
policies as the ideologies of governments have differed, for example 
with nationalisation in the 1960s and 1970s followed by privatisation in 
the 1980s and 1990s. A concern to promote large firms or "national 
champions" in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to a desire to support 
smaller firms later on. Similarly, a desire to support the manufacturing 
sector in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to a neutral approach in the 
1980s. One major exception to this has been the continuity seen in policy 
towards transnational corporations, with both foreign- and British-
based transnationals being given a free rein over many years, and with 
an intensification of efforts to attract foreign transnationals in the 
1980s (Bailey el al, 1994). 
Inconsistency has also been seen in many areas of policy. In competi-
tion policy, for example, governments have accepted the need to correct 
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for market failures, whilst at the same time maintaining weak and 
ineffective monopolies and mergers policies (Pitelis, 1994). Moreover, 
some authors have argued that British experience has been one of 
industrial policies without an industrial strategy (Cowling and Sugden, 
1993). Following Pitelis (1994), industrial policies can be seen as mea-
sures designed to improve the performance of industry, whilst an 
industrial strategy consists of a well thought-out set of industrial 
policies that are reasonably consistent and coherent with the aim of 
realising well-defined, long-term objectives. British experience is thus 
seen as different in comparison with perceived Japanese policy over 
many years. 
Taking this further, reactiveness is seen in policy being characterised 
by re-active, ad-hoc measures taken in response to crises, whether the 
collapse of British Leyland, the crisis in the coal industry (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1993), or more recently the BSE scare in the beef industry. 
Reactiveness is also seen in the motivation of government intervention 
itself. A reactive policy can be defined in terms of a policy which solely 
reacts to correct market failures (externalities, public goods, monop-
olies ... ). In contrast, as Jacquemin (1987, in Oughton, 1997) notes, a more 
positive policy goes beyond market failure, and considers strategies 
which "deliberately influence the transformation and the industrial 
reorganization of sectors, and nations", noting that "in many sectors 
comparative advantages are based on partially controllable elements". 
He points to policies that might alter the accumulation of physical and 
human capital over time, which in turn might alter relative capital 
endowments. The experiences of MITI up until the 1970s at least could 
be seen as such a pro-active approach, in contrast with British experi-
ence. A proactive strategy would also be necessary to address some of 
130 (130) 
the systemic deficiencies arising in market based economies; problems 
of transnationalism, centripetalism and short-termism (Cowling, 1990). 
Finally, and connected with this reactive approach, it can be argued 
that British industrial policy has been liberal, built on a belief that 
industrial performance is best left in private hands, assisted only at the 
margin by state activity (Reynolds and Coates, 1996). As Wilks (1983, in 
Reynolds and Coates, 1996) notes; 
a major operational value of British industrial policy is not maintenance of 
market principles (as in Germany) ... or the productivity of the enterprise (as 
in Japan) but rather a concern to sustain the autonomy of the firm. This 
concern might be regarded as the purest of market principles or, more 
correctly, as the ultimate market ethic, since it really presupposes that 
national economic benefit (good of all) is derived only from the individual's (in 
this case the individual firm's) interpretation and unfettered pursuit of per-
sonal benefit. 
More recently, the government's 1994 Competitiveness White Paper 
noted that the "essential conditions for Britain's economic success are 
low inflation, low taxes, free trade and freedom from excessive state 
interference". 
This is not to say that there have not been specific interventions at 
certain points in time, for example in intervening in the 1960s and 1970s 
to encourage large size and to "pick winners" (Pitelis, 1994). However, 
these sectoral measures were arguably withdrawn in the 1980s (a period 
of withdrawal of support, and a decline in regional expenditure and 
privatisation), with a refocusing around horizontal measures with the 
aim of "providing the right underlying conditions to catalyse and 
facilitate growth in the context of declining trade barriers and in-
creased competition" (Oughton, 1997). However, as Oughton notes, such 
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a withdrawal was not complete; with 60% of the government R&D 
budget remaining spent in just two sectors - defence and civil aero-
space. 
With this concern for productivity growth, so-called "competitive-
ness" became the key goal of industrial policy under the previous 
Conservative government, and is set to continue under Labour with the 
appointment of several business people to key advisory and ministerial 
posts, such the former chairman of BP, Lord Simon, now Minister for 
Trade and Competitiveness in Europe. However, whilst the role of 
investment in broad capital was seen as essential to improving the 
growth rate of the economy, the previous Conservative government did 
not identify any British under-performance in investment in fixed and 
intangible assets, and therefore felt no action was necessary to improve 
the rate of investment. Thus there were key differences in objectives 
between the EU and Britain. The former prioritised the promotion of 
full employment, and hence the need to raise investment rates in Europe 
so as to increase capacity and productivity, whilst this was not explicit-
ly recognised in Britain (Oughton, 1997). It seems that the new govern-
ment has shifted the position on this, recognising British deficiencies in 
this respect, although it is not clear at this stage what the government 
is willing to do to tackle the problem. 
3. Promoting Economic Development 
Before outlining what might need to be done to promote economic 
development, one needs to examine and identify the problems faced by 
the British economy. In doing so, attention will be given to the regional 
dimension, using the example of the West Midlands economy, the 
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manufacturing heartland of Britain. 
With this in mind one particular concern is the fundamental defi-
ciencies that result from the concentration of decision-making power in 
large corporations. These corporations are where the strategic planning 
takes place for our economies. In other words, these large corporations 
make their decisions over investment, the rate and direction of techno-
logical change, wages, where and what to produce, levels of employ-
ment, etc. in their own interests, and these decisions have a dominating 
influence on the regional and national economies in which the firms do 
or do not operate. For example we have seen this in the past over 
decisions by car producers in Britain, and one of the worries about 
Rover being controlled by BMW is that decisions over Rover's future 
are now taken in Bavaria, Germany. Likewise decisions crucially 
affecting the future of Rover's suppliers in the West Midlands and 
elsewhere. Similarly there is worry over Jaguar's position with Ford, 
the relationship between Detroit and Coventry. Some may argue that 
all of this is fine-after all, for example, Ford is to produce the new 
Jaguar XK8 in the West Midlands. However, it is only doing so after 
intense lobbying, a subsidy of several hundred million pounds from the 
government and arguably increasing job insecurity and worry for both 
the employees of Jaguar and for all of those smaller firms in the region 
dependent on Jaguar's existence. Overall, then, a fundamental difficulty 
faced by an economy such as the West Midlands is its position at the 
periphery, and its dependence on key decisions made elsewhere (see 
Cowling and Sugden, 1994, for more details). 
Associated with this difficulty, the economy is allegedly plagued by 
so-called "short-termism". In part this arises because the key long term 
decisions are made within the large corporations which are divorced in 
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many instances from any long term commitment to a particular local-
ity. But also it might be argued that the British economy in general 
suffers from the short-termism imposed on it by the institutional 
arrangements making up its market system, including the City of 
London, the banking institutions, and government competition policy (ie 
the lack of effective takeover regulation). A key outcome of such a 
problem has been inadequate investment. Despite the Conservative 
government's belief that this is not a problem, international compari-
sons of investment per employee indicate that Britain has one of the 
worst performances amongst OECD countries (see Oughton, 1997). The 
reasons for this are complex, but may include: heavier use by British 
firms of equity finance, and the associated problem of the arms-length 
relationship between banks and industry; the tax treatment of retained 
earnings and dividends; high variation in cyclical demand; low rates of 
return in British firms; and the weakness in competition policy which 
allows a highly active market for corporate control. As we will see, 
some of these factors are being considered by the new Labour govern-
ment, whereas others are not. 
What should done about these problems? One of the most crucial 
areas to consider, if one accepts the argument that concentration of key 
decision-making in the large corporations is a major problem, is to 
nurture the successful development of smaller firms. Moreover in 
addressing this issue there is widespread evidence from successful, in 
particular regional, economies around the world that what really 
matters is the nurturing of appropriate groups of small firms. These 
might be seen in terms of what Miller and Sugden (1995) term "small 
firm webs"; the idea is that smaller firms can mutually support each 
other in evolving close, long term and trusting relationships, which 
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experience suggests would be especially innovative and dynamic. What 
seems to matter is not simply that firms work in groups, but that these 
groups comprise firms that systematically and coherently link together 
across a range of activities to exploit jointly R&D opportunities, train-
ing initiatives, marketing activities, and so on, rather than coming 
together to exploit an essentially ad-hoc, short-run opportunity. 
Associated with this, it might be seen to be crucial to foster appropri-
ate institutional arrangements to promote long term planning of indus-
trial activity within and by the smaller firms. For example, this would 
ideally include the development of a banking system solidly rooted and 
growing out of the traditions and culture of a particular locality, fully 
aware of the needs of industry in that locality. Again there is interna-
tional experience - for example from Italy, Germany and Spain -
implying that this is vital. 
This also leads on to the issue of competition policy. It seems clear 
that there is an acute need for a policy which prevents takeovers that 
establish and further the dominance of the large corporations. This 
would in turn force and enable many firms to think long-term because 
they would realise that growth through acquisition might not be viable, 
and because they would be free from peering over their shoulders at 
potential predators in the takeover market. This might imply, for 
example, a total ban on mergers over a certain size. Of course arresting 
the adverse spread of large firms would not be simply negative; it might 
positively assist smaller firms to enter the market; what has been said 
already about encouraging smaller firms is itself a crucial aspect of 
competition policy. 
Developing still further this concern with small firms, training must 
be given a high priority. Transferable skills and adaptability as well as 
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best practice in particular industry sectors must form the basis of any 
training policy. Again what appears to be especially important is to 
identify the needs of smaller firms. This would seem to imply the need 
for coherent regional policies on education, whereby appropriate part-
nerships are formed between groups - or webs - of small firms and 
local educational institutions, schools, colleges of further education, 
universities, technology centres and so on. These initiatives need to be 
designed and implemented within the regions; the idea of a national 
blueprint seems ill conceived. 
Lastly, tax policy needs to be consistent with, and as far as possible 
support, the activities of smaller firms, and to be conducive to long-
term thinking and planning. Some fairly simple taxation changes could 
have quite dramatic effects on small companies, for example in freeing 
up working capital for them. However it would also appear that tax 
policies alone would be far from sufficient to achieve the sorts of 
effects contemplated here. It's to this that we turn first. 
4. The Government's Approach 
4.1 Changing the Tax System 
One idea Labour floated in its election manifesto was to create tax 
credits for R&D. Whilst increasingly seen as having been beneficial in 
the US, there is an inherent danger involved in their use, in that tax 
credits for R&D are likely to benefit large firms most of all - because 
it is these firms which have formal R&D labs, and which formally 
account for most R&D expenditure - yet not necessarily for actual R& 
D output (See Geroski, 1990). Small firms are therefore not likely to 
benefit greatly from such as approach. In other words we need to look 
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beyond tax policy to foster innovation in small firms. 
An aspect of tax policy which might be useful, however, is concerned 
with short-termism. Here the Chancellor Gordon Brown acted virtually 
immediately, altering the tax system in the first budget to eliminate the 
tax advantage to firms from paying out dividends rather than retaining 
profits. The hope is that the latter will be boosted, in turn helping 
investment. Whether this will have much impact is debatable - we will 
have to wait and see on this, but it seems at first sight a useful initial 
step. Another government proposal is to change the tax system to 
encourage longer term shareholding. Details have not been spelled out 
yet, but this could involve a sliding scale capital-gains tax (implying 
that the tax reduces the longer the shares are held). This would argua-
bly be a move in the right direction although again one doubts the 
strength of its impact if taken as an isolated measure. 
4.2 Training 
On training, Labour has dropped its unpopular idea of a levy (where 
firms not training up to a "desirable" level were to face a levy, or tax). 
Instead it now proposes "Individual Learning Accounts", to which 
individuals, the state and employers are asked to make financial 
contributions, but with the individual making the decision over the 
direction of the training. On face value this may be beneficial, but alone 
will not be enough to tackle Britain's training deficit. The failure of the 
TECs ("Training and Enterprise Councils") also needs to be addressed, 
both in terms of their lack of democratic accountability and their lack 
of responsiveness to regional needs. As Mawson (1996) notes, the impo-
sition of a national training "straightjacket" has made it difficult to 
adjust to local needs and circumstances. New, local organisations will 
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need the freedom to identify local needs and to construct strategies to 
tackle them, a freedom which is missing at present. 
4.3 Competition 
On competition policy, Labour's proposals have been consistently 
watered down. It had proposed before the election a new institution 
responsible for administering takeover rules, and under these the 
bidding firm would have to demonstrate that the takeover would lead 
to an increase in efficiency and serve the public interest. This would 
represent a change in the onus of proof compared to existing legisla-
tion, and such a body would also, it is claimed, be more active in seeking 
out and addressing anti-competitive practices. During the election, 
however, such (already limited) ideas were diluted further, for fear of 
offending the business community (Labour being keen to be seen as the 
pro-business party). All that is left is the desire to enforce existing 
legislation more effectively, as was seen in the initial refusal to allow 
the takeover of Carlsburg by Bass in the brewing industry shortly after 
the election. 
In general, the government seems excessively timid over competition 
policy. It has rejected the idea that it should "throw some grit in the 
wheels of the takeover mechanism". But why not? Study after study 
show the disruptive impact of takeover on companies' activities, with 
post-takeover profits usually not rising (ie extra monopoly power post 
-takeover being negated by other efficiency losses). Furthermore, the 
constant threat of takeover forces management to waste time over 
putting in place defensive arrangements and to think short-term. The 
takeover-mechanism simply does not operate the way many text books 
tell us. It is not inefficient firms which are acquired by efficient ones, 
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and as a result the benefits of such a high level of takeover activity are 
largely illusory. This is compounded by the hundreds of millions of 
pounds wasted every year through takeovers on merchant banks' fees 
and the like. A tougher approach is needed. 
4.4 Regional Development 
Perhaps most promising is that the government proposes the creation 
of Regional Development Agencies to co-ordinate economic develop-
ment, encourage technology transfer (albeit it is unclear between whom 
and for what purposes), to bridge the gap between small firms and 
providers of finance, and to improve small business advice and support 
through more effective cooperation between local agencies. This is 
clearly in line with some of the suggestions above concerning what 
would be desirable. In principle there is considerable scope for more 
imaginative policies via these Regional Development Agencies in 
encouraging the creation of small firm "webs", perhaps through tying in 
with the Chambers of Commerce, thus taking advantage of existing 
links between firms, and with Local Authorities. However, at the time 
of writing, there appears to be something of a conflict going on between 
the Deputy Prime Minister (who is also responsible for the Regions, 
Environment and Transport) and the Education Secretary who wants to 
keep control of training. Who wins will determine the shape of these 
new agencies; the danger is that they will end up as agencies simply 
attracting inwarp investment, which may do little to build indigenous 
capabilities. 
4.5 Finance 
ln another promising angle to policy, Labour had developed ideas 
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before the election for a government investment agency, on which talks 
with major banks and leading venture capital companies have been 
held. The idea is for the proposed agency to underwrite a certain 
proportion of the equity invested by a venture capital firm in fledgling 
firms. This effective subsidy could be repaid out of profits, with the 
government thus retaining an interest in the firm. Such an agency 
would be located in the Department of Trade and Industry and would 
also be a focal point for assistance for small firms (The Guardian, 28/ 
8/95). This is very promising. 
However, critics might point to the perceived failure of the National 
Enterprise Board under the last Labour government in the 1970s, which 
was accused of taking on and rescuing "lame ducks" like British 
Leyland. The purpose of any investment agency under the current 
government would have to be diametrically opposite in fostering the 
development of small firms. An appropriate regional structure to such 
an agency might help to prevent any central tendency towards protect-
ing large firms again emerging to hijack policy. This does not mean· 
that large firms would not benefit at all from such an agency. It might 
facilitate the development of industry-specific strategies which could 
benefit all firms in that industry. However, its focus will have to be in 
encouraging small firms if past mistakes are to be avoided. 
Therefore the government might usefully think about extending such 
an investment agency into the regions, perhaps in the form of Regional 
Development Banks (RDBs). There is certainly a strong case to be 
made for these. The idea is that the RDBs could build closer, long-term 
links with local industry (especially local small firms) than exist at 
present, hopefully offering advantages in terms of lower information 
costs, accelerated bank-learning after recessions, avoiding high collat-
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eral demands, and in assisting the development of clusters or webs of 
local firms (Kelly et al, 1995). It is quite feasible that they could operate 
as private sector entities. Much might be learned for example from the 
operations of the 3i venture-capital company: it is regionally-based, 
lends long-term and was originally established through state initiative 
but now operates in the private sector. Such banks might also act to 
spread stakeholder values (see Bailey and Clancy, 1997). 
Such an approach could go some way to overcoming the short-ter-
mism inherent in the banking system. At the moment we see arms-
length, uncommitted banking with finance for small firms often pro-
vided on an overdraft basis. Reinforcing this hands-off attitude towards 
small firms has been a trend towards increasing centralisation of 
decision making over lending decisions outside the region, in banks' 
head offices (Cowling and Sugden, 1994). Whilst Soskice (1996) makes 
an important point in arguing that Britain cannot simply import ele-
ments of, say, Germany's or Japan's (more long-termist) banking sys-
tem as transplanting institutional policies across systems rarely works, 
there is still scope for government initiative, for example in setting up 
RDBs, providing a catalyst for change of the present system from 
within. 
Labour has flirted with such ideas. Its pre-election policy document 
Winning for Britain proposed establishing regional investment 
agencies which would in part "act as catalysts for new regional invest-
ment banks dedicated to mobilising savings generated in each region ... 
focusing particularly on the needs of small and medium sized firms". 
What is ultimately needed is a network of regionally-based organisa-
tions supporting webs of small-firms, and which need to be receptive to, 
and supportive of, initiatives coming up from the local level on such 
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matters as joint training, marketing, R&D and so on. This also links 
into reform of local democratcy; for example what will be the relation-
ship between regional development agencies and the proposed new 
structures for regional government? 
4.6 Corporate Governance 
The government's proposals on corporate governance and the so-
called stakeholder economy are perhaps worthy of comment. Here at 
least there is a recognition that stakeholders are not just shareholders 
but also workers, suppliers, customers and banks. Evidence from 
dynamic regional economies elsewhere suggests that Britain has much 
to learn in recognising a wider community of interests. There would 
seem to be a role for government here at least in spreading what is seen 
to be best practice, and the dispersion of interests perhaps seen in the 
stakeholder concept is possibly in line with concerns above regarding 
the concentration and centralisation of key decision-making in the 
large corporations. Potentially, the concept is far reaching. However 
Tony Blair's statement that stakeholding will not involve any legisla-
tive changes suggests little will be done to alter corporate governance 
arrangements which put the shareholders first. It requires a change in 
business culture so profound that it is impossible to achieve on a purely 
voluntary basis. Only recently the President of the Board of Trade (in 
effect the Minister for Trade and Industry) Magaret Beckett criticised 
business' proposals for changing corporate governance, arguing that 
short-termism would not be curbed without more far reaching mea-
sures. However, the government is being naive in thinking business will 
do much of its own accord - this is one area where government action 
is essential in driving change. Much might be learned from experience 
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elsewhere, such as Germany and Japan, where corporate governance 
structures seem to help in fostering more long-term thinking (see 
Hutton, 1995). 
4.7 Europe 
Turning to look at economic policy more generally, a number of 
issues will impact on how British industry will perform in the short-
and medium-term. The issue of EMU (European Monetary Union) is 
never far from the headlines. Getting the decision right on this (whether, 
and if so, when to join) will impact on businesses in various ways. 
Firstly it will impact on the value of sterling as international investors 
look to see what will happen. Entry, if it finally happens, will also 
impact by reducing uncertainty and exchange costs for business, whilst 
at the same time removing the devaluation option as an adjustment 
mechanism for the economy. 
In reality the government is set to continue the inherited Euro-sceptic 
outlook, critical of further political integration in Europe. There has 
been symbolic change, for example in adopting the Social Chapter on 
workers' rights, but little else has altered. The government has kept the 
previous "wait and see" attitude to joining EMU, having ruled out 
membership for this parliament (ie until 2003 at the latest). However, it 
has indicated that it could consider joining after the next election, 
assuming that both Labour wins and that EMU appears to be working. 
Desperate not to be accused of being "soft" on Europe, Labour anyway 
committed itself during the election to a referendum on membership. 
This is now a key political constraint for the government, as public 
opinion is overwhelmingly negative, and the government would lose any 
vote if it put EMU membership to the test in the short run. Time is 
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needed to campaign for a "yes" vote. 
On the economic side there are two problems; one cyclical and the 
other structural. Cyclically the British economy is further ahead than 
continental Europe, reaching the peak of its cycle, with correspondingly 
higher interest rates than the rest of Europe which is just emerging 
from recession. A single monetary policy across Europe would mean 
much lower interest rates in Britain than at present, with either the risk 
of unleashing inflation or a much tighter, off-setting fiscal policy being 
required. As the latter is deemed off-limits politically, the government 
hopes to hold things steady until the rest of Europe catches up in the 
cycle. This is a risky strategy, though, as so much can happen in the 
mean time. 
Structurally the British economy is different in a number of ways 
from the rest of Europe, for example in being more sensitive to short-
term interest rates, with both companies and individuals holding more 
debts exposed to variable interest rates. Britain could hardly be said to 
form part of any "optimal currency area" comprising Germany, Den-
mark, Austria, the Benelux and maybe even France. Little is being done 
to tackle such structural differences and to prepare the British econ-
omy for entry, however, raising questions about the government's real 
commitment to join, or perhaps questions about its appreciation of the 
economic consequences. 
4.8 Macro-Economic Policy 
On monetary policy the government acted immediately on entering 
office by handing over control of interest rates to the Bank of England. 
Giving the Bank operational independence meant that the interest rate 
rises deemed necessary by the government could be taken without 
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political criticism for itself. This was a shrewd move in party-political 
terms, but raises fundamental questions of democratic accountability. 
After all, a key reason why the previous government was not re-elected 
was because it had made a mess of monetary policy during the 1992 
ERM crisis. Whatever the failings of the British democratic system, the 
government was held accountable for what happened. The Bank faces 
no such democratic accountability. We also wonder whether this is just 
another "miracle cure" for the British economy, like the ERM and the 
"Medium Term Financial Strategy" were under Thatcher, and incomes 
policies under the previous Labour government. A correlation between 
Central Bank independence and low-inflationary performance does not 
imply causation, and simply imposing independence may do nothing to 
improve long-term performance. Where independent central banks 
appear to have worked, as in Germany, it may be due more to a shared 
value-system in favour of a tight monetary policy, a consensus built in 
this case on experiences earlier this century with hyper-inflation. There 
is no such shared value system in Britain and the "top down" imposition 
of an independent Bank of England may not have the same effects. 
Not surprisingly, the move is having very severe consequences for 
industry. The Bank, which always took a more hawkish line on the 
inflationary outlook than the previous Chancellor Kenneth Clarke, is 
keen to establish anti-inflationary credibility, and has raised interest 
rates on several occasions since the election. The result of this tight 
monetary policy has been a rapid appreciation for sterling, which has 
got back to levels not seen since pre-ERM crash days in 1992. The fear 
is that Britain is repeating the mistakes of the early 1980s, when the 
manufacturing base collapsed under an excessively tight monetary 
policy and over-valued exchange rate. 
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This raises the question of whether the mix between monetary and 
fiscal policy is right. It can be argued that macro-policy is too unbal-
anced for the health of industry, that monetary policy should be 
loosened (benefiting industry by lowering interest rates and aiding a 
depreciation of sterling) and instead fiscal policy tightened. Unfortu-
nately the government has given itself no room for manoeuvre. In 
another election pledge, it committed itself to not raising income tax 
during this parliament. It seems determined to stick to this commit-
ment, even though on entering office business leaders actually called for 
tax rises to stem inflationary pressures rather than interest rate rises. 
The irony is that the government is keen to be seen as pro-business, but 
on this occasion ignored business' advice. 
A looser monetary/tighter fiscal mix would not only have direct 
benefits in terms of assisting industrial development, but could also 
offer the prospect of raising revenue for the government to spend on 
education, infrastructure and an industrial policy with teeth. In sum-
mary, macro-economic policy is too orientated towards what may be 
seen as politically acceptable (ie not raising taxes) than what is needed 
for industrial development. This is probably the most telling evidence 
that the government has no concept of an over-arching industrial 
strategy, as it would not be imposing such an austere macro-economic 
policy if its main objectives were industrial development. The That-
cherite neo-liberal agenda of low-taxation and a minimalist role for 
the state remains firmly in place. 
5. Conclusion 
Industrial policy in Britain over the past few decades has been 
146 (146) 
described as "discontinuous, inconsistent, reactive and liberal". Whilst 
a few important and useful measures are likely to be made by the new 
government - such as tax changes to encourage more long-term think-
ing and the creation of regional development agencies - it might seem 
little is set to change fundamentally (except that at least there will be 
a degree of continuity!). Thatcher may have been replaced by Major 
and now Blair, but the Thatcherite agenda remains firmly in place. The 
new government offers nothing in the way of an "industrial strategy" 
which will tackle the key problems of the concentration of decision 
making power within large corporations, and short-termism. As sev-
eral other critics now note, Britain is not in a position where growth 
and prosperity can be achieved without strategic involvement by the 
government and other actors. Problems are being further compounded 
in the short run by an unbalanced macro-economic policy which is 
handicapping industry. The danger is that as soon as the current boom 
fades, the old symptoms of stop-go, low-growth, unemployment, insecu-
rity and declining public services will re-emerge, and with it may be 
lost the chance to restructure the economy. 
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